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Credit Unions, Consolidation and Business Formation: Evidence from Canadian provinces 
 
Abstract 
This study empirically evaluates the impact of consolidation activity in the credit union system on 
the rate of business formation at the regional level. A theoretical framework is developed which 
supports a number of hypotheses. First, it is hypothesized that there is no systematic relationship 
between the relative size of the credit union system, as measured by credit union assets per 1,000 
working-age (15-64) individuals, and the rate of business formation among these individuals. 
Second, it is hypothesized that competition, as measured by the number of credit unions per 1,000 
working-age individuals, will negatively moderate the relationship between the relative size of the 
credit union system and the rate of business formation. Finally, it is hypothesized that there is a 
statistically positive relationship between competition and the rate of business formation. Drawing 
on Canadian provincial-level data for the period 1992-2009, it provides statistical evidence from 
fixed effects models that robustly supports the first hypothesis, but weakly supports the other two 
hypotheses. These findings suggest that policies and regulations that are intended to create a level 
playing field in a consolidated banking sector may have implications for small business formation; 
therefore, they warrant attention when formulating policies that are aimed at facilitating small 
business and entrepreneurship development. 
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Credit Unions, Consolidation and Business: Evidence from Canadian provinces 
1. Introduction 
The consolidation of the financial services industry in North America is an important 
phenomenon that warrants attention (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). One of the major 
concerns that it raises is whether increasingly large financial intermediaries in concentrated credit 
markets will systematically curtail small business lending. Concerns along this line are warranted 
because such an outcome may undermine the ability of new and small firms to make significant 
contributions toward innovation, job creation and regional development (Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, 
Howitt and Prantl, 2009; Baumol, 1990; Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Schumpeter, 1934).  
Since the bulk of prior studies have primarily focused on the question of how mergers 
among federally chartered banks impact small business lending (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995; 
Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1996; Craig and Hardee, 2007; 
Francis, Hasan and Wang, 2008; Keeton, 1996; Strahan and Weston, 1998), very little systematic 
evidence is available on the patterns and implications of consolidation activity in the community 
banking segment; yet, structural changes in this segment may have implications for the rate of 
business formation across the communities and regions within countries.  
This study systematically evaluates the major recent structural changes in the Canadian 
credit union system, and attempts to quantify the impact of consolidation activity on the rate of 
business formation across provinces. By way of preview, it will be shown that the consolidation of 
the credit union system is unlikely to have a significantly adverse impact on business formation on 
its own. However, when subjected to competition-enhancing policies, a consolidated credit union 
system may be less conducive to new business formation. As will be discussed, this has implications 
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for the formulation of coherent small business and entrepreneurship policies, and therefore warrants 
attention. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section evaluates the major 
structural changes that are currently unfolding in the Canadian credit union system. A theoretical 
framework is then developed to support a number of hypotheses on the relationship between credit 
union structural variables and the rate of new business formation at the regional level. This is 
followed by a description of the data, sample, measures and the statistical methods employed. The 
results are then presented. The final section discusses the key findings, contributions and limitations, 
and concludes by focusing on the policy implication. 
2. Structural Changes in the Canadian Credit Union System 
Figure 1 shows the values of the assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) held by Credit 
Union Central of Canada (CUCC)-affiliated credit unions in nine of the ten Canadian provinces 
(excluding Québec) over the period 1992-2009. In absolute terms, it is evident that the size of the 
credit union system, as measured by the value of total assets, has been growing over the period of 
study.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Using the core consumer price index (CPI), as defined by the Bank of Canada, and 2002 as 
the base year, the inflation-adjusted asset values of CUCC-affiliated credit unions were computed. 
This is shown in Figure 2.  What is clear is that the nominal and inflation-adjusted asset values of 
CUCC-affiliated credit unions have moved in tandem at least since 1992. This implies that the 
Canadian credit union system has grown in both nominal and real terms. 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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Interestingly, the Canadian credit union system has also been growing in relative terms. 
Figure 3 shows credit union asset density, as defined by the value of CUCC-affiliated credit union 
assets per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals, across provinces from 1992 to 2009. It is evident 
that the credit union system has been growing faster than the working-age population in all 
provinces, albeit at different rates. In general terms, the asset values of CUCC-affiliated credit 
unions per 1,000 working-age individuals ranged from CDN$543,325 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador) and $8.7 million (Saskatchewan) in  1992 compared to CDN$1.6 billion (New 
Brunswick) and CDN$19.8 billion (Saskatchewan) in 2009. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 4 shows a time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union asset density. It can be seen that this 
real measure of the relative size of the credit union system conveys the same information as nominal 
credit union asset density shown in Figure 4; thus, the relative size of the Canadian credit union 
system has increased in both nominal and real terms between 1992 and 2009. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 shows the number of CUCC-affiliated credit unions by province over the same 
period. In absolute terms, there has been a relatively steady decline in the number of independently 
operated credit unions across provinces.  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
To evaluate the trend in the number of credit unions in relative terms, credit union density, 
as defined by the number of (CUCC-affiliated) credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) 
individuals, was computed. This information is conveyed in Figure 6. It is evident that there has 
been a decline in the number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age individuals, albeit at different 
6 
 
rates across provinces. In general terms, credit union density ranged from 0.05 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Alberta and British Columbia) and 0.32 (Saskatchewan) in 1992 compared to 0.01 
(British Columbia) and 0.10 (Prince Edward Island and British) in 2009.  
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Although the reported data excludes Desjardins-affiliated caisse populaires in Québec, and 
non-CUCC affiliated credit unions/caisse populaires in general, the emerging story is that the 
Canadian credit union system is becoming more concentrated. The salient developments in the 
credit union system may be summarized by the following two empirical observations: (1) credit 
union asset density has been increasing across provinces, and (2) credit union density has been 
decreasing across provinces. Taken together, these facts suggest that a small number of large players  
are playing an important role in the Canadian credit union system.  
A central question in this study is whether a more concentrated credit union system, as 
implied by the two empirical observations above, will inhibit or foster business formation. Figure 7 
shows that the number of newly registered businesses was either relatively constant or increasing 
between 1992 and 2009 in absolute terms.  
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
However, a much different picture emerges when new business formation is expressed in 
relative terms. Figure 8 shows entry density - as defined by the number of newly registered 
‘employer’ businesses (that maintain a payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the 
owner) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals - by province over the period 1992-2009. It is 
evident that there has generally been a decline in entry density across provinces over this period. For 
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instance, entry density ranged from 5.89 (Ontario) and 16.24 (Prince Edward Island) in 1992 
compared to 5.81 (Nova Scotia) and 10.82 (Prince Edward Island) in 2009.  
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
The finding of a downward trend in the rate of new business formation among working-age 
individuals and an apparently upward trend in the concentration of the credit union system suggests 
that concerns about the adverse impact of the latter on business formation are not misplaced. At the 
same time, this time series evidence is only suggestive. To quantify the impact of consolidation 
activity on business formation, a multivariate regression analysis is required. A theoretical 
framework is developed to support such an analysis in the next section. 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Consolidation and small business lending 
This study primarily draws on the existing literature on the relationship between the 
structural characteristics of the banking sector and small business lending. Central to this research 
agenda is the question of whether a competitive or a concentrated banking sector will increase or 
decrease credit supply to small businesses. Since bank credit is an importance source of external 
finance for informationally opaque young and small firms, one may draw conclusions about the 
potential impact of the banking sector structure on business formation from the evidence on the 
relationship between banking sector structure and small business lending. In particular, the evidence 
suggests that merged banks may reduce the share of small business loans in their loan portfolios 
relative to their pre-merger levels (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995); Berger and Udell, 1996; 
Keeton, 1996; Peek and Rosengren, 1996).  This suggests that consolidation activity in the banking 
sector may inhibit business formation. However, Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) suggest 
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that there is a static industrial organization (IO) view behind this inference that is incomplete. They 
offer, instead, a dynamic IO view. 
According to the dynamic IO view of the effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on 
small business lending, M&As not only change the strategic focus of the merged bank, but also the 
reaction of other banks to M&A activities in the banking sector. When these dynamic effects are 
taken into account, any bank-size related decline in small business lending that is directly attributed 
to M&As may at least be partially offset by an increase in small business lending among lenders in 
the same market that do not participate in such M&A activities (Berger et al., 1998; Craig and 
Hardee, 2007). If this is so, then the net effect of consolidation activity on business formation may 
be negligible at the macro level. 
3.2. Hypotheses 
As credit unions become larger, they may lose their comparative advantage in small business 
lending. This is primarily attributed to the tendency of large financial institutions to not only 
centralize lending decisions, but also place greater emphasis on independently verifiable 
information that new and small firms generally lack (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 
2005; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Furthermore, relatively large credit unions that are finding it 
increasingly costly to provide relationship-based loans may reduce the share of such loans in their 
portfolios if competition intensifies in the credit market; that is, large credit unions may lack the 
incentive to extend credit to new and small firms on favorable terms if competition makes it easy for 
the latter to break away from the relationships they have forged with credit unions (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995).  
Insofar as the growth in credit union asset density reflects the growth and increasing 
dominance of above-average size credit unions, one would expect a negative relationship between 
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credit union asset density and the rate of business formation among working-age individuals. 
However, if this relationship is evaluated at the regional level, the dynamic IO view of consolidation 
activity suggests that there may not be a systematic relationship between credit union asset density 
and business formation (Berger et al., 1998). Furthermore, a decline in the number of competing 
credit unions across regions may mitigate any potential negative effect that the expansion and 
consolidation of the credit union system may have on business formation. This is so because credit 
union members are more likely to loyal to their credit unions when only a few exist; and credit 
union managers in turn may be willing to extend small business loans on favorable terms to 
members deemed loyal. This leads to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: The rate of business formation is not systematically related to credit union 
asset density at the regional level; and 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Credit union density will negatively moderate the relationship between credit 
union asset density and the rate of business formation at the regional level. 
Alternatively, when viewed in isolation, greater competition in the credit union system at the 
regional level may positively impact new business formation (Rogers, 2012).  This is consistent 
with standard IO theory which suggests that competitive markets are likely to yield greater 
quantities of goods at lower prices relative to markets that are dominated by few players. In the case 
of credit markets, one would expect an increase in the supply of credit as the number of financial 
intermediaries increase, all else equal. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The rate of new business formation is positively related to credit union density 
at the regional level. 
4. Research Method 
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4.1. Data and Sample 
To empirically evaluate the hypotheses developed in the previous section, this study draws 
on provincial-level data on credit union structural variables from Credit Union Central of Canada. In 
addition, it draws on provincial-level data on new business registrations from Statistics Canada’s 
Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) file. A number of publicly available Statistics 
Canada tables were also used as data sources for this study. A balanced panel dataset was prepared 
on the variables described below for nine of the ten Canadian provinces over the period 1992-2009. 
This yields 162 province-year observations. 
4.2.Measures 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in entry density. This variable was defined above as the number of 
newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age individuals. Entry density serves a 
proxy for the rate of business formation among working-age individuals.  An increase (decrease) in 
entry density implies an increase (decrease) in the number of new businesses with employees per 
1,000 working-age individuals. 
4.2.2. Credit union structural variables 
Credit union asset density is used to capture both the relative size of the credit union system 
and the growth, and the potential dominance of above-average size credit unions that are expanding 
much faster than their small counterparts in Canada. Meanwhile, credit union density is used as a 
proxy for the degree of competition in the credit union system. An increase (decrease) in credit 
union density is associated with an increase (decrease) in the degree of competition in the credit 
union system, all else equal. Although the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index was considered as a 
general measure of credit market concentration, its inclusion was precluded due to data limitations. 
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4.2.3. Control variables 
To mitigate a variety of conflating influences on the relationship between the rate of new 
business formation (entry density) and credit union structural variables (credit union asset density 
and credit union density) in our analysis, a number of control variables are included in the 
multivariate regression models described below. Specifically, controls are applied for the 
demographic characteristics of Canadian provinces. This includes the age, education, gender and 
immigration characteristics of these provinces. 
To the extent that age is negatively correlated with risk-taking propensity, or positively 
correlated with human capital (i.e. business experience or organizational skill), provinces with a 
relatively high share of individuals who are above the median age may have a relatively low, or high 
propensity for entrepreneurship, respectively, up to a certain age (Blanchflower, Oswald and 
Stutzer, 2001; Lévesque and Minniti, 2006; Lévesque, Shepherd and Douglas, 2002; Madsen, 
Neergaard and Ulhoi, 2003). Therefore, the use of provincial median age as a control variable is 
justified. In addition, we also controlled for cross-province differences and temporal changes in 
human capital by using the share of the adult population (age, 25-44) with a Batchelor’s degree as a 
control variable.  This is appropriate because prior studies have found a positive relationship 
between formal education and entrepreneurship (Bates, 1990; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Henley, 
2005). 
The share of the provincial population that is female is used to control for the influence of 
gender on the relationship between the rate of new business formation and credit union structural 
variables. This is justified because prior studies have found gender-based differences in the 
propensity for entrepreneurship, startup capital, access to finance, among others (Birley, 1989, 
2006; Blanchard, Zhou and Yinger, 2008; Brush, 1992; Kim, 2006; Lee and Rendall, 2001). 
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Meanwhile, the share of newly landed immigrants is used to control for the conflating influence of 
immigration on new business formation. This is appropriate because prior studies have found 
relatively high rates of self-employment among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Lofstrom, 2002), while 
others have not found any systematic differences in the rates of self-employment between 
immigrants and natives (Brock and Evans, 1986; Levie and Smallbone, 2007). 
Consolidation activity in the credit union system is a notable phenomenon in an otherwise 
consolidated banking sector. Indeed, this appears to be the case for the Canadian banking sector, 
where a handful of federally chartered banks dominate the financial industry (i.e. Royal Bank of 
Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce and the National Bank of Canada). An interesting question is whether the 
consolidation activity in the credit union system will adversely impact business formation when 
combined with a concentrated federally chartered banking sector.  
At the regional level, consolidation in the credit union system need not significantly inhibit 
business formation if the small firms that are dropped by large or merged credit unions are picked 
up by small or unmerged credit unions. Bank loan density (i.e. federally chartered bank loans per 
1,000 working-age individuals) is used as a proxy for the relative size of the federally chartered 
banking sector. As a control variable, it allows us to isolate the potentially negative impact that 
Canada’s concentrated, federally chartered banking sector may have on the rate of new business 
formation either directly, or when combined with consolidation activity in the credit union system. 
4.2.4. Statistical Methods 
The fixed-effects estimator is used to estimate the relationships between credit union 
structural variables and entry density. The use of the fixed-effects estimator is justified on the 
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grounds that it allows us to control for differences in the unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
across provinces. In addition, its use justified based the Hausman test.  
For each province indexed i, the linear panel regression model to be estimated is as follows: 
                                                   
                                                              
                                                                             
                                              
According to the hypotheses developed above: credit union asset density will not be systematically 
related to entry density (i.e.     ) (i.e. hypothesis 1a);  credit union density will negatively 
moderate the relationship between credit union asset density and entry density (i.e.     , and 
statistically significant) (i.e. hypotheses 1b); and finally, credit union density will be positively 
related to entry density (i.e.     , and statistically significant) (i.e. hypothesis 2). The vector of 
controls constitutes the provincial demographic, economic and banking sector structural variables 
discussed above, as well as province and time fixed effects. The latter two are used to control for 
unobserved time-invariant province-level heterogeneity (i.e. constant province-specific intercepts) 
and macroeconomic shocks (i.e. constant time-specific intercepts). 
A number of steps are taken to address common violations of the standard assumptions that 
underpin the classical linear regression model. Specifically, multiple model specifications are used 
to untangle the joint effects of correlated bank and credit union structural variables on the rate of 
business formation. Meanwhile, robust standard errors are computed to address a potential violation 
of the assumption that the variance of the error term is constant. Finally, since credit union structural 
variables and entry density are measured contemporaneously, the potential for endogeneity bias in 
the estimation exists. To mitigate endogeneity bias in the estimation, another set of fixed effects 
models are estimated using one-period lagged values of the credit union structural variables.  
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients reported are Table 1. The 
average province has a relatively high standard of living with a real per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) (in 2002 Canadian dollars) of CDN$33,246. In addition, it generates almost 10 
newly registered businesses per 1,000 working-age individuals each year. In the average province, 
50 percent of the population is just below 37 years old, and the male-female ratio is almost 1:1.  In 
addition, the average province receives approximately 9 percent of newly landed immigrants. At 
CDN$16,887 in federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans and CDN$ 5,098 in inflation-
adjusted (CUCC-affiliated) credit union assets per 1,000 working-age individuals, the federally 
chartered banking sector is significantly larger than the credit union system in the average province. 
There are approximately 0.07 CUCC-affiliated credit unions for every 1,000 working-age 
individuals in the average province. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The fixed-effects coefficient estimates are reported in Table 2. Among the control variables, 
a systematic negative relationship seems to exist between entry density and the provincial median 
age variable. The coefficient estimate ranges from -0.634 to -1.036 and are significant at either the 5 
or 10 percent level of significance. Neither immigrant share nor female share seems to 
systematically impact entry density. This also applies to provincial real GDP per capita. 
In all the model specifications considered, credit union asset density is not found to be 
systematically related to entry density. Thus, there is robust evidence in support of hypothesis 1a. 
However, we do not find robust evidence in support of hypotheses 1b and 2. Specifically, credit 
15 
 
union density has a statistically negative moderating effect on the relationship between credit union 
asset density and entry density (i.e.   = -0.003, 10 percent level of significance) in only one of the 
four model specifications. We also have only one out of four model specifications in which there is 
a statistically positive relationship between credit union density and entry density (i.e.   = 22.2, 5 
percent level of significance). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The fixed-effects models that generate these results can explain between 76.2 and 77.6 
percent of the within variation in entry density, and between 24.1 and 29.2 percent of the overall 
variation in entry density. However, the estimation may suffer from endogeneity bias. As explained 
above, we attempt to mitigate endogeneity bias in the estimation by using one-period lagged values 
of credit union structural variables. The fixed-effects estimates of the regression models with these 
lagged values are reported in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As before, we find systematic evidence in support of a statistically negative relationship 
between provincial median age and entry density; and a statistically positive relationship between 
the share of the provincial population with a Batchelor’s degree and entry density. However, we still 
find that credit union density has a statistically negative moderating effect on the relationship 
between credit union asset density and entry density in only one of the four model specifications 
(i.e.   = -0.004, 10 percent level of significance). Thus, the evidence in support of hypothesis 1b 
remains weak. However, we now find a statistically positive relationship between credit union 
density and entry density in two of the four model specifications (i.e.   = 28.09 and 26.24 at the 5 
and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively). While this somewhat strengthens the evidence 
in support of hypothesis 2, the potential for more robust evidence remains. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has investigated the extent to which an expanding and increasingly concentrated 
credit union system impacts the rate of business formation at the regional level in Canada. It makes 
a number of contributions to the existing literatures on both financial and non-financial determinants 
of new business formation. In particular, it contributes to the existing literature on the relationship 
between demographics and business formation by confirming a number of findings in prior studies. 
Specifically, it provides robust evidence in support of a negative relationship between age and 
business formation, and a positive relationship between the attainment of university-level education 
and the rate of business formation. These findings are consistent with prior studies that find a 
negative correlation between age and risk-taking propensity (Blanchflower et al., 2001), and others 
that emphasize the importance of formal education for entrepreneurship (Bates, 1990; Colombo and 
Grilli, 2005; Henley, 2005). 
This study also contributes to the literature on the relationship between the structural 
characteristics of the banking sector and new business formation. However, the strength of the 
evidence is mixed on the relationship between credit union structural variables and the rate of 
business formation at the regional level. Specifically, it provides robust evidence which suggests 
that there is no systematic relationship between the expansion of the credit union system across 
regions and the rate of business formation across these regions. But since the expansion of the credit 
union system is partly attributed to the growth in the asset base of merged credit unions, this finding 
suggests that the small firms that are dropped by large credit unions may be picked up by smaller 
credit unions that have not participated in merger activity. This is consistent with the dynamic IO 
view of consolidation activity on small business lending (Berger et al., 1998).  
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Meanwhile, the evidence is not robust on the relationship between competition, as captured 
by the number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age individuals, and the rate of business 
formation; and on the moderating role of competition on the relationship between the relative size of 
the credit union system and the rate of business formation. At best, there is suggestive evidence that 
while an increasing number of credit unions may foster business formation, small businesses may be 
better served by fewer credit unions in an increasingly concentrated credit union system. Consistent 
with prior studies, competition in the credit union system seems to foster business formation (Roger, 
2012). At the same time, business formation may progress at a slower rate if competition intensifies 
in a concentrated credit union system. In other words, while competition seems to create credit 
market conditions that apparently make it easier for new and small firms to gain better access to 
credit, it may lead some credit unions to curtail small business lending. The latter may stem from 
the potentially high cost of retaining members in a highly competitive environment. 
More generally, this study adds to the dearth of research on the nature of consolidation 
activity in the community banking segment by systematically analyzing and characterizing the 
ongoing episode in the Canadian context. By focusing on business formation in the Canadian 
context, it departs from prior studies that primarily focus on the impact of consolidation activity on 
small business lending in the United States (US) (Berger et al., 1995; Berger et al., 1998; Berger and 
Udell, 1996; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Keeton, 1996; Strahan and Weston, 
1998). Given the well-documented differences in the financial histories of the US and Canada, this 
departure is warranted. 
Until recently, for instance, the US essentially had a unit banking system that prohibited 
inter-state branching (Bordo, 1995). In contrast, Canada has not only long had unlimited branching, 
but its federally chartered banking sector also evolved into a highly concentrated market structure 
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long before consolidation activity intensified in the US. Furthermore, it is notable that the recent 
trend in consolidation activity in the North American financial services industry may have more to 
do with the credit union system in Canada relative to the broader banking sector in the US. 
Therefore, the credit union system warrants particular attention in the Canadian context. 
6.1. Limitations 
There are two limitations that must be borne mind when evaluating the results in this study. 
First, as with any study that draws on aggregate data to estimate the relationship between banking 
sector structural variables and business formation, the potential for endogeneity bias in the 
estimation is a concern.  Although one-period lagged values of credit union structural variables were 
used to mitigate endogeneity bias in the estimation, it remains a concern. Therefore, the estimated 
effects of credit union structural variables on entry density should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, data limitation precluded the use of general measures of credit market concentrated such as 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index in this study. At the same time, this does not seem to lead to 
qualitatively different results when compared to prior studies that use this measure along with per 
capita bank-size measures that are similar to the credit union density measure of competition that is 
used in this study (Roger, 2012). 
6.2. Policy Implications 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study presents findings that are relevant for the 
formulation of small business and entrepreneurship policy. In particular, it contributes to the 
ongoing discourse on the merit of a level playing field for federally chartered banks and credit 
unions. The elimination of the exclusive tax benefits that credit unions have traditionally enjoyed is 
one way to create a level playing field in the banking sector. However, this study offers preliminary 
evidence which suggests that competition-enhancing policies along this line should be scrutinized 
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more carefully given the potentially adverse implication for young and small firms that rely on 
financing from a concentrated credit union system. To provide policymakers with a platform that 
supports the formulation of coherent small business and entrepreneurship policies, it is important for 
future studies to systematically evaluate this issue. 
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Figure 1. A time plot of credit union assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) by province over the 
period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince 
Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; 
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Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia, BC. Source: Credit Union Central of 
Canada (CUCC). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) by 
province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, 
NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, 
MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia, BC. Source: Credit Union Central of 
Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 3. A time plot of credit union assets (in thousands of Canadian dollars) per 1,000 working-
age (15-64) individuals (“credit union asset density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The 
nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, 
PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; 
Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 4. A time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union assets (in thousands of Canadian dollars) per 
1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals (“inflation-adjusted credit union asset density”) by province 
over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and 
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Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; 
Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union 
Central of Canada (CUCC). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A time plot of the number of credit unions by province over the period 1992-2009. The 
nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova 
Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, 
and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 6. A time plot of the number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals 
(“credit union density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as 
follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New 
Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British 
Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 7. A time plot of the number of newly registered ‘employer’ businesses – defined by the 
maintenance of a payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the owner - by province over 
the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; 
Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; 
Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Longitudinal Employment 
Analysis Program (LEAP) file, Statistics Canada. 
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Figure 8. A time plot of the number of newly registered ‘employer’ businesses (that maintain of a 
payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the owner) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) 
individuals (“entry density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered 
are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New 
Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British 
Columbia; BC. Source: Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) file, Statistics Canada. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations, 1992-2009. 
 
 Mean SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Entry density a  9.639  
 
  2.787  
 
- 
     
2. Provincial median age 36.793 
 
 2.681  
 
-0.352*** -     
3. Female share b 
 
49.774 
 
 0. 545  
 
-0.108 0.662*** -    
4. Batchelor’s degree 
share c  13.768 
  
 3.145  
 
-0.449*** 0.529*** 0.011 -   
5. Immigrant share d  9.308 
 
 16.476 
 
-0.410*** -0.053 0.026 0.455*** -  
6. Bank loan density e 16,887 6,975 
 
-0.149+ -0.228** -0.195* 0.360*** 0.772*** - 
 
7. Provincial real GDP 
per capita 33,246 11,790 
 
-0.206** 0.374*** -0.282*** 0.728*** 0.183* 0.191* 
 
8. Credit union asset 
density f 5,088 4,487 
 
-0.051 0.073 -0.283*** 0.234** -0.147+ -0.211** 
 
9.     Credit union density g 0.074 0. 060 
 
0.201* -0.282*** -0.078 -0.422*** -0.346*** -0.436*** 
          
       7. 8. 9. 
7. Provincial real GDP 
per capita  
 
   
 
   -   
 
8. Credit union asset 
density f   
 
   
 
   0.273*** -  
9. Credit union density g  
 
 
 
   -0.321*** 0.393*** - 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001; number of province-year observations, n = 162. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given   
  province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
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Table 2. Effects of credit union asset density and credit union density on entry density, 1992-2009. 
This table reports the fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the marginal and joint effects of credit union asset density 
and credit union density on entry density 
a
. Starting with a baseline regression model that includes a standard set of 
control variables, credit union structural variables are subsequently added to yield more completely specified regression 
models. All variables are contemporaneously measured. Robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients are 
reported in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
 
 
Provincial median age  
-0.707
*
 
(0.230)
 
-0.990
*
 
(0.386) 
-1.036
*
 
(0.346) 
-0.634* 
(0.207) 
-0.988
*
 
(0.401) 
-0.817
*
 
(0.348) 
-0.992
+
 
(0.348) 
 
 
Female share 
b
 
 
-0.556 
(0.680) 
0.020 
(0.991) 
0.146 
(0.868) 
-0.808 
(0.624) 
-0.130 
(1.150) 
-0.895 
(0.851) 
-0.135 
(1.084) 
 
 
Batchelor’s degree share c 
0.305 
(0.168) 
0.237 
(0.137) 
0.233 
(0.139) 
0.296 
(0.160) 
0.199 
(0.118) 
0.190 
(0.118) 
0.200 
(0.130) 
 
Immigrant share 
d
 
-0.153
*
 
(0.048) 
-0.116
+
 
(0.059) 
-0.114
+
 
(0.061) 
-0.151
*
 
(0.046) 
-0.099 
(0.056) 
-0.080 
(0.052) 
-0.098 
(0.062) 
 
Provincial real GDP per 
capita 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Bank loan density 
e
 
 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union asset density 
f
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union density 
g
   
1.614 
(2.883)  
15.103 
(10.192) 
22.207
*
 
(9.417) 
15.409 
(10.399) 
 
Bank loan density*credit 
union asset density       
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Credit union asset  
density*credit union density    
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003
+
 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Controls for province & 
time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 
59.709
+
 
(27.854) 
41.583 
(37.434) 
36.643 
(32.327) 
70.283
*
 
(25.587) 
48.630 
(44.532) 
81.399
*
 
(31.409) 
48.891 
(40.342) 
R
2
:               within 0.762 0.771 0.771 0.764 0.776 0.768 0.776 
     overall 0.241 0.269 0.272 0.247 0.292 0.254 0.288 
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given   
  province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
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d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
 
Table 3. Effects of credit union asset density and credit union density on entry density, 1992-2009. 
This table reports the fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the marginal and joint effects of credit union asset density 
and credit union density on entry density 
a
. Starting with a baseline regression model that includes a standard set of 
control variables, credit union structural variables are subsequently added to yield more completely specified regression 
models. Credit union asset density and credit union density are lagged one period relative to the contemporaneously 
measured dependent and the control variables. Robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
 
 
Provincial median age  
-0.740
*
 
(0.219) 
-1.142* 
(0.424) 
-1.201
**
 
(0.356) 
-0.580
**
 
(0.171) 
-1.129
*
 
(0.405) 
-0.995
*
 
(0.378) 
-1.164
*
 
(0.478) 
 
 
Female share 
b
 
 
-0.290 
(0.624) 
0.524 
(0.997) 
0.690 
(0.788) 
-0.840 
(0.473) 
-0.319 
(1.049) 
-0.272 
(0.826) 
-0.282 
(1.035) 
 
 
Batchelor’s degree share c 
0.346
+
 
(0.180) 
0.260
+
 
(0.129) 
0.257
+
 
(0.130) 
0.331
+
 
(0.163) 
0.220
+
 
(0.083) 
0.217
+
 
(0.104) 
0.233
+
 
(0.114) 
 
 
Immigrant share 
d
 
-0.091
+
 
(0.048) 
-0.106 
(0.058) 
-0.086 
(0.048) 
-0.144 
(0.042) 
-0.061 
(0.041) 
-0.044 
(0.041) 
-0.054 
(0.049) 
 
 
Provincial real GDP per 
capita 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Bank loan density
 e
 
 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union asset density 
f
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union density 
g
   
 
1.862 
(3.418)  
22.316 
(12.247) 
28.093
*
 
(11.582) 
26.243
+
 
(13.239) 
 
Bank loan density*credit 
union asset density       
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Credit union asset 
density*credit union density    
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004
+
 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Controls for province & 
time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 
46.838 
(25.453) 
21.559 
(36.468) 
15.123 
(28.273) 
69.777
**
 
(19.215) 
30.725 
(39.324) 
55.976
+
 
(29.101) 
32.824 
(37.785) 
R
2
:         within 0.755 0.772 0.772 0.761 0.784 0.778 0.786 
overall 0.238 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.212 0.150 0.158 
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
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c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
